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ON THE FORMATION OF PRODUCTION NETWORKS OF SMALL 
BINOCULAR MANUFACTURERS IN JAPAN’S EARLY POSTWAR PERIOD 
 
Hiroshi FUKUSHIMA 
Saga University 
 
 
ABSTRACT:  In Japan’s early postwar period, binoculars became a leading export product. Nearly a 
hundred percent of binoculars made in Japan were shipped to the United States in the early years after 
exporting began. Japanese binoculars were able to take over 90 per cent of the U.S. import market for more 
than a decade from mid 1950s.  
What factors made it possible for Japanese binoculars to show the remarkable performance in the U.S. 
import market for more than a decade?  To investigate sources of the competitiveness of binoculars in those 
days will be helpful to understand conditions of industrial development, because this case may add an 
illustrative example of the emergence of competitive SMEs (Small and Medium Enterprises) in a chaotic 
economy.  
Quality is an element of competitiveness. A method of press-molding optical glass was, among other 
things, recognized as a comparatively advantageous technology which was inherited from the wartime 
development of optical munitions directed by the Japanese Navy and Army. Thus, the quality was largely 
ensured by the technology and other inherited skills.  
On the other hand, price competitiveness of Japanese binoculars derived mainly from a flexible 
manufacturing system of specialized firms which were agglomerated as a cluster in the northern part of 
Tokyo after the end of the war. This production system as a network was formed by small assembly and 
component manufacturers. 
In this paper I will show a brief history of binocular development in Japan and refer to the main 
background of competitiveness of this industry in the early postwar period. In this context, factors creating 
networks of small specialized binocular firms in a particular area of Tokyo are focused upon. Further, the 
effectiveness of these networks is discussed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
When Japan could start exporting again in the early 
postwar period, binoculars were a leading export 
item along with other light machinery products such 
as bicycles and sewing machines. For the first 
couple of years, nearly 100 percent of binoculars 
made in Japan were shipped solely to the United 
States. It was not so long before Japanese 
binoculars took over more than 90 percent of the 
share of the import market on binoculars in the 
U.S.. 
 
What made it possible for Japanese binoculars 
to capture such a predominant market share in the 
U.S. for more than a decade?  It will be helpful to 
investigate factors of the competitiveness of 
binoculars in those days, because this case may 
present an illustrative example of the emergence of 
competitive SMEs (Small and Medium Enterprises) 
in a chaotic economy.  
 
In this paper, the performance of Japanese 
binoculars in the U.S. import market during the 
early postwar period is described in Chapter 2. In 
Chapter 3, the historical development of Japanese 
binocular industry in prewar days is explained. 
Then in Chapter 4, the postwar development of the 
industry is written. In Chapter 5, factors of 
competitiveness of Japanese binoculars are 
explained. Here, competitiveness is divided into 
quality and price elements and both are explained in 
what way competitiveness of those elements were 
attained. Finally, implications of this case are 
discussed in Chapter 6 as a conclusion. 
 
2. JAPANESE BINOCULARS IN THE U.S. 
IMPORTED MARKET 
 
There appeared an obituary notice in the NY Times 
on March 31, 2005 (p.25 column 5) as follows: 
 
David P. Bushnell (March 31, 1913 - March 24, 
2005) was an American entrepreneur. Mr. 
Bushnell founded his company, Bushnell, in 
1948. At that time, binoculars were largely an 
item of luxury. Through a strategy of 
importation from foreign markets, Bushnell 
made binoculars widely available to 
middle-class Americans for the first time. 
Bushnell died at the age of 91 at his home in 
Laguna Beach, California. He was a 
quartermaster with the U.S. occupying forces 
in Japan after World War II and he was 
assigned to evaluate the products 
manufactured by the Japanese. He related that 
most of the products were of very low quality 
but that the optics were of extremely high 
quality and very inexpensive. These high 
quality binoculars became very popular and 
were the first product of his successful 
business. 
 
As the obituary noted Bushnell contributed to 
transforming a binocular from a luxury item to a 
daily use product by importing Japanese binoculars, 
and they were successful in capturing the U.S. 
market.  In 1950s and 60s, Japanese binoculars 
took more than 90 per cent share of the import 
market on binoculars in the U.S. (Table 2.1).  
 
Table 2.1 Japanese Binocular Share in the U.S. 
Import Market  
Year Quantity Value 
1954 
1958 
1963 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
89.7 % 
98.6 
98.1 
94.3 
94.2 
90.4 
88.1 
87.4 
83.7 
78.4 
85.6 %       
96.6 
95.1 
92.6 
93.2 
90.2 
89.3 
-- 
86.7 
82.7 
(Source) Kikai Shinko Kyokai (1977:108） 
 
What kind of factors made such an 
internationally competitive industry?  The 
development of the binocular industry in Japan 
seems to present some clues about the pattern of 
economic development.  
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(Source) Data from Kikai Shinko Kyokai (1977:95) 
 
3. PREWAR DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
BINOCULAR INDUSTRY IN JAPAN  
 
Before continuing on with the post-World War II 
development, it will be helpful to look back at the 
early history of the industry. To know how Japanese 
optical technology was developed in the pre-war 
period seems to be essential to understand the 
post-war development of the industry. 
 
The first prism-type binocular was reportedly 
made by Carl Zeiss in Germany in 1893, followed 
by Goerz in Germay and Ross in Britain. Zeiss 
binoculars of 6 and 8 powers were imported by 
Konishiroku Co. before Sino-Japan War 
(1894-1895) for military use. 
 
In 1911, the first Japanese prism-type binocular 
(“Victor”) was made by Fujii Lens Seisakusho 
founded by Ryuzo Fujii in1908. Before starting 
his business, Fujii had been a Japanese Navy 
engineer and sent to study optical technology in 
Germany. During the study Fujii visited London 
and dropped in at a shop of Ross. The shop master 
was well acquainted with him and showed a newly 
made prism-type binocular which was the first 
product of that kind in England. Fujii could 
purchase the sample product which was not for sale 
and he returned to Japan with this binocular.  
 
In 1908 a precision machine manufacturing 
factory, Seiki Seisakusho, was established within 
the Army’s Arsenal in Tokyo and manufacturing of 
binoculars began in the work. When the First World 
War broke out in 1914, many of precision 
instrument materials and products like optical glass 
and binoculars could not be imported from Europe. 
The Navy thought it was urgently necessary for 
Japan to ensure self-sufficient capabilities of the 
strategic products which could not be made 
domestically. Therefore, the Navy urged several 
private companies to establish one large optical 
munitions manufacturer. The Navy asked 
Mitsubishi for its cooperation and in July 1917, 
Nihon Kogaku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha (later 
NIKON) was founded by merging the Optical 
Works Division of Tokyo Keiki and Iwaki Glass 
Company. Both were small but had leading optical 
technologies. In the following year, May 1918, Fujii 
Lens Seisakusho was merged into the company.  
Mitsubishi was the major share-holder of the 
company. 
 
While Nihon Kogaku worked mainly for the 
Navy, the Army which had been in a rapid 
expansionary movement needed another optics 
company which could meet the demand. The Army 
asked Seikosha (Hattori Clock) which had a 
technology of Optical Instruments for its 
cooperation. In 1932 the Tokyo Kogaku Kikai 
Kabushiki Kaisha (later Topcon) was founded 
mainly by the Hattori family. Katsuma Kogaku 
Kikai Seizosho which had manufactured lens and 
binoculars for Hattori was merged into the new 
company.  
 
Thereafter, the Army procured optical munitions 
from Tokyo Kogaku as the main supplier, while the 
Navy procured mainly from Nihon Kogaku as 
before. However, owing to expansion of battle lines, 
demands for optical munitions grew further to a 
dozen times of existing production capabilities.  
 
To cope with this situation, the Army promoted 
projects of cultivating private optical instrument 
plants, resulting in a pick-up of eight competent 
binocular manufacturers such as Tomioka Kogaku, 
Takachiho Kogaku(later Olympus Optical Co.) and 
Yashima Kogaku 1 .  The group was named as 
“Hachi Ko Kai”( “Eight Lights Association”). They 
had meetings regularly on every eighth of months 
to exchange information and for mutual cooperation. 
Materials and testing instruments were provided for 
them by the Army. They cooperated together in 
such activities as R&D and visiting plants of other 
firms. Gradually their technology progressed and 
they could reach a level of making products on the 
basis of standardized specification. The Army 
nurtured the group members in such a way of 
giving them a special order of binoculars for all 
non-commissioned officers in 1930s.  
 
As the war was ending, the Navy needed 
smaller binoculars for the newly organized brigades 
to guard coast lines of Japan’s mainland and islands. 
In order to standardize specifications for the Navy 
and the Army, some specification designs of 
binocular models were provided for these new 
manufacturers by Nihon Kogaku and Tokyo 
Kogaku. These specification designs contributed to 
forge a basis for the models of postwar Japanese 
binoculars. 
   
 
                                                  
                                                 
1 Kikai Shinko Kyokai(1977:16) 
4. POSTWAR DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
BINOCULAR INDUSTRY  
 
When the World War II ended in 1945, Nihon 
Kogaku and Tokyo Kogaku lost one hundred 
percent of their orders from the Navy and the Army 
on which their businesses depended solely. The 
number of employees of Nihon Kogaku was over 
25,000 as of the end of the war but the figure 
became 1700 in October 1945.2  
 
As for Tokyo Kogaku, the peak of the 
employees totaled about 8000 at the end of the war. 
All the employees were unemployed after August 
1945.  The company was permitted to operate 
again with 200 employees in November 1945. In 
1946, the number of employees recovered to 800 by 
accepting its former employees who returned from 
overseas. As a result, more than 7000 employees 
lost their jobs for the case of Tokyo Kogaku.3
 
After several months passed from the end of the 
war, people who had engaged in binocular 
manufacturing businesses got together and 
cooperated to establish two industry associations; 
the Japan Optical Instrument Industry Cooperative 
(the established year unknown) and the Japan 
Optical Precision Machinery Industry Association
（April,1946）.  
 
The former was organized by leaders of small 
and medium scale binocular manufacturers and its 
initial members consisted of 15 companies. On the 
other hand, the latter was consisted of major optical 
instrument manufacturers such as Nihon Kogaku, 
Tokyo Kogaku, Seiki Kogaku (later Canon Co.) and 
Konishiroku.  
 
 
2 Nihon Kogaku Kogyo (1960:245) 
3 Kogaku Kogyoshi Henshukai(1955:763) 
At that time, optical instrument manufacturers 
were at a loss what to make in the midst of a 
chaotic economy. In those days, there were cases in 
which staff members of the occupation forces 
visited optical instrument factories and mostly they 
were interested in binoculars for their souvenirs. 
Observing this tendency, those manufacturers 
thought it might be possible to export binoculars. 
 
Representatives asked GHQ for permitting the 
export of binoculars through the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry and the Trade Agency4.  
By asking GHQ many times eagerly, they could 
start exporting binoculars to the U.S. in August 
1947.  
 
Exports of Japan in the early postwar period 
were administrated by the Trade Agency and the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry under the 
control of GHQ.  In July 1947, “the Mining and 
Industrial Products Trading Public Corporation” 
was established as a Government organization to 
centralize trading procedures for mining and 
industrial products 5  . The Trading Public 
Corporation purchased exporting goods from 
domestic private exporters and exported them under 
the name of the Trading Public Corporation. Being 
designated as important products for the export, 
binoculars were required by the Corporation to be 
inspected by entrusted inspectors. In the early stage, 
inspectors were sent to working places of exporting 
companies by major manufacturers like Nihon 
Kogaku.  Quality inspection of exporting goods 
was regarded to be essential and effective to prevent 
defective products from being sold in overseas 
markets. 
                                                                                                   
4 Both were reorganized later as “the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry” in 1949. 
5 Textiles, foodstuff and raw materials were 
excluded as they were controlled by separate 
trading public corporations. 
 
On the other hand, members of the Optical 
Instrument Industry Cooperative which was 
consisted of small and medium firms gathered and 
exchanged information. One day someone heard 
that the PX (Post Exchange, or retail store) of the 
Occupation Forces was interested in purchasing 
binoculars at reasonable prices.  The cooperative 
asked a trading (private) company to sell their 
products to the PX, resulting in the first order of 
binoculars.  The cooperative as one organization 
could receive the order. Member firms of the 
cooperative were very glad to get the order but 
faced a quite difficult task to control qualities of 
products made by various manufacturers. There was 
no inspection institution at that time, so that 
manufacturers made alternate inspections of other 
members’ products by themselves before the 
delivery. The cooperative tried to ensure quality 
levels and due dates by checking products strictly 
and visited member factories even late at night. 
 
In this way, manufacturing binoculars became 
an export industry. During the multiple exchange 
rates period, the exchange rate of binoculars was set 
to be 500 yen per one dollar. The binocular 
manufacturing business was quite profitable before 
the unified fixed exchange rate was fixed to be 360 
yen to one dollar in April 1949. Moreover, what 
delighted exporters was that they could receive cash 
as soon as they discounted export bills by banks in 
a high inflationary period. Observing flourishing 
firm owners6, many firms entered into the binocular 
manufacturing business, which caused a secular 
trend of declining exporting prices.  
 
 
6 As exporting amount increased, vehicles used by 
binocular makers changed from bicycles to motor 
bikes, then small cars, next big domestic cars, 
finally to foreign cars.(according to the former 
secretary of the cooperative, Hiraga) 
5. FACTORS OF COMPETITIVENESS  
 
5.1 An Inheritance of the wartime technology 
development  
One of the reasons why the Japanese binoculars 
could perform well in the U.S., and later in 
European markets, in the early postwar period  
was owing to the optical glass processing 
technology which had been developed during the 
war.  
 
The press-molding method of optical glass 
processing was developed by a glass work expert, 
Rihachi Sumita who founded Sumita Kogaku 
Kogyo in 1924. The method was adopted by the 
Army and the Navy as a common technology after 
an Army engineer, who was going to be a professor 
at Tokyo University, acknowledged the supremacy 
of the method in around 1942.7 The new method 
improved yield rates of optical glass processing 
dramatically to approximately 80 per cent from less 
than 40 per cent of the previous “cutting process” 
method in which shaping a block of optical glass 
into a form of lens or prism was made by cutting. 
 
Table 5.1 Number of Binocular Manufacturers 
 By Location 
                As of July 1965 
Location Number 
Tokyo 199 
Saitama 12 
Nagano 3 
Kanagawa 3 
Gunma 1 
Osaka 1 
Aichi 1 
Total 220 
(Source) MITI, 1965, Survey Report on Binocular 
Component Manufacturers 
 
                                                  
7 Kikaishinkokyokai(1977:40) 
Reasons why Japanese binoculars could take 
overwhelming shares in the U.S. import market for 
a long time in the postwar period seemed to be 
partly attributable to almost self-sufficient 
capability of productive processing of optical glass. 
With the press-molding process method, Japanese 
optical glass could be supplied at far less cost than 
that made in other countries.  
 
Figure 5.1 Itabashi Ward in Tokyo 
 
 
   Table 5.2 Location of Binocular Component  
         Manufacturers 
Num ber of Num ber of 
Lens M anufacturers Body M anufacturers
Tokyo 169 Tokyo 41
Itabashi 72 Itabashi 29
Arakaw a 14 O ta 5
Toshim a 12 Arakaw a 1
Kita 11 Nerim a 1
Nerim a 8 Toshim a 1
Setagaya 6 Kita 1
Shinagaw a 5 Shinagaw a 1
O ta 5 Edogaw a 1
O ther Tokyo 30 Shinjuku 1
O ther 65 O ther 3
Total 234 Total 44
(Note) As of M arch 1961
(Source) Takeuchi, A. (1962),  
 
5.2 Cluster formation in northern area of Tokyo  
In Itabashi Ward in Tokyo, there lived many 
engineers and skilled workers who had engaged in 
optical munitions production for Tokyo Kogaku 
during the wartime period, because Tokyo Kogaku 
which was located in Itabashi had been the main 
supplier of binoculars and other optical products for 
the Japanese Army’s Tokyo Arsenal since its 
foundation in 1932. 
 
As the company lost its demands after the war, 
as aforementioned, most of its 8000 employees had 
to leave out from the company. Many of those who 
had engaged in binocular production works started 
their own businesses based on their skills and 
technology, such as lens grinding and casting metal 
works in Itabashi.  
 
Then a question arises why another cluster of 
small binocular makers did not emerge in southern 
area of Tokyo where Nihon Kogaku was located?  
Some factors of locating in this particular area in 
and around Itabashi Ward were as follows. 
 
5.2.1  Area of technology resources 
A Tokyo Army Arsenal plant had been operated in 
Kita Ward (neighboring ward of Itabashi) until the 
end of the war. For this reason, Tokyo Kogaku 
located its headquarters and main factory in this 
area.8  In Itabashi there had been many small 
metal processing factories existed from prewar 
period9 and not a few unemployed workers with 
optics related skills lived after the war. 
 
5.2.2  Area of easy access  
According to Takeuchi’s survey 10 , of the 28 
responded assembly factories, 24 chose 
convenience of purchasing components and 
existence of other manufacturers in the same 
                                                  
8 Seiki Kogaku Kenkyusho (later Canon) also located its 
initial factory in Itabashi in prewar period, although it 
moved before the breakout of the WWII to southern 
Tokyo where the Navy Arsenal and Nihon Kogaku 
(Nikon) operated in the surrounding area. 
9 Especially copper processing skills had been 
developed.(Saito()) 
10 Takeuchi(1962:50) 
industry as reasons for locating in Itabashi. Also 9 
out of 10 component factories considered 
convenience of product delivery as an essential 
condition for the location. Once firms gathered in 
nearby areas, they could get benefits through 
cooperation, accessing information, 
complementary production, etc. With this power of 
clustered firms, binocular manufacturers located 
and increased in Itabashi and its surrounding area. 
 
5.2.3  Area of earlier development 
Considering the cluster development of small 
binocular manufacturers, it seems that the earlier 
development of Itabashi than Shinagawa and Ota 
or southern Tokyo area should be regarded as a 
crucial factor. Once firms got together in a limited 
geographical area, they had the advantage of 
exchanging information and cooperating for the 
benefit of themselves. This situation yielded a 
self-reinforcing mechanism of clustering binocular 
firms in Itabashi observed in late 1940s in the 
postwar period.  
 
5.3 Flexible manufacturing system 
Then, what is the relationship of competitiveness 
and cluster formation in this case?  
 
Almost all of Japan’s binocular exports were 
shipped to the US market which was characterized 
by volatile demands, particularly in the Christmas 
season.  Manufacturers faced rapid decrease of 
sales after shipment for Christmas and product 
prices had to be cut to maintain quantity of sales.  
 
One of the characteristic features of production 
system of binoculars was the division of 
manufacturing processes of components by many 
small and medium-sized firms. Being processed 
through these firms, components and cover cases 
were made and assembled into completed 
binoculars. This style of production made Japanese 
binoculars possible to penetrate quickly into the 
world market at very competitive prices. The style 
was a endogenously generated flexible 
manufacturing system. 
 
Figure 5.2 Image of Binocular Production Networks  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Roughly speaking, two main materials for 
manufacturing binoculars are glass and metals. 
Processes of the former include grinding and 
centering of lens, while processes of the latter are 
such as molding, plating and so on.  For each of 
such processes factories became independent 
specialized component manufacturers. Skills of 
manufacturers and their capabilities were well 
known among firms in the area and assembly 
makers knew who could make what.  
 
Making a single binocular required more than 
one hundred processes.  For an assembly 
manufacturer trading with at least 20 to 30 
component manufacturers was necessary. Therefore 
assembly manufacturers had to arrange and control 
due dates of components. Assembly manufacturers 
needed to procure materials for component 
manufacturers. This internally developed 
production network system in the cluster could 
respond quickly to the volatile demands.  
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5.4 Government support for establishing 
inspection institution  
 
When binocular production began in the postwar 
period, the Optical Instrument Industry Cooperative 
inspected voluntarily the members’ products to be 
sold to the PX of the occupation force bases in 
Japan. This was done by mutual inspection at each 
manufacturing factory.  
 
After the export of binoculars became possible, 
the cooperative had inspectors with experienced 
skills within the organization and started inspection 
of exporting binoculars for fees in 1950 under the 
approval of the Trade Public Corporation 11 . 
Inspected products by the organization were not 
only those of members but also of non- members. 
However, large corporations like Nihon Kogaku 
made their binoculars inspected at the Japan 
Telescope Inspection Association which was 
established with the support of Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI). Later the 
organization as an independent inspection 
institution became the only authorized organization 
which could inspect binocular exports under the 
control of MITI in 1953. At the same time, the 
Government enacted a strict regulation so that no 
binoculars could be exported without passing 
inspection of the authorized institution. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Product quality and lower prices were two main 
sources of competitiveness for Japanese binoculars 
in the postwar period.  
 
Technology, which developed during the World 
War II, helped maintain quality level of Japanese 
binoculars made by small manufacturers because 
most of them had skills and technology experiences 
of manufacturing binoculars or other optical 
munitions during the war. Standardized designs of 
binoculars and rapid expansion of production 
capability during the war by the Japanese Navy and 
the Army caused a spillover effect of binocular 
technology among private manufacturing firms in 
the postwar period. Moreover, the press-molding 
method of optical glass processing technology 
which was developed in the wartime contributed to 
produce quality lens and prism at inexpensive 
prices. Thus, the quality level was largely ensured 
by these inherited technologies and skills.  
                                                  
11 “30 -Years History of the Optical Instrument 
Industry Cooperative” 1980 (in Japanese) 
 
On the other hand, price competitiveness of 
Japanese binoculars derived mainly from a flexible 
manufacturing system of specialized firms which 
were agglomerated as a cluster in the northern part 
of Tokyo. Cluster formation of binocular firms 
could not be realized if there had not been Tokyo 
Kogaku (later Topcon) and the Tokyo Arsenal of the 
Japanese Army in the same area, because there had 
been small factories without having orders and 
skilled unemployed workers there in the immediate 
postwar days. 
 
This production system as a network was 
formed endogenously by cluster members of  
small assembly and component manufacturers. 
Assembly makers could make an order of 
components by one telephone call or go directly to 
nearby factories. Demands of the product were very 
volatile as they were dependent on the Christmas 
seasons in the U.S. market. Facing volatile volumes 
of demands, a typical binocular manufacturer did 
not have inventories of products and kept its scale 
in a small size.  Basically they started production 
upon receiving orders. That was a management 
style of binocular manufacturers to adapt to change 
in volume of orders.  
 
As Japanese binoculars showed good 
performance per cost, they could take high 
percentage of the imported binocular market in the 
U.S.. The high cost-performance of binoculars 
continued owing to lean and flexible manufacturing 
system of small firms. Thus, competitiveness of 
Japanese binoculars over other countries continued 
as an outstanding rank in the world market until 
early 1980s. 
 
On the other hand, domestically fierce 
competitive situation made exporting prices of 
binoculars follow a decreasing trend. Manufacturers 
reacted to form cartels in 1960s, but the story of 
development of these cartels is not within the scope 
of this paper’s objective.  
 
In this paper, I stress the importance of heritage 
of technologies and human networks or social 
capital for the development of an industry. I have 
tried to depict this relation by illustrating the case of 
small binocular manufacturers in Japan. 
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